Левада-Центр: От мнений

Nagorno-Karabakh and the attitude towards countries against the background of the conflict: September 2023
01.12.2023

There is a high awareness of Russians about the military conflict in Nagorno–Karabakh – 81% have at least heard something about it, every fifth respondent followed the events closely. Respondents blame the USA and NATO countries (41%) for the resumption of the conflict, to a lesser extent Azerbaijan (15%) and Armenia (11%). Over the 7 years of the conflict, sympathy for the Azerbaijani side has doubled – 10%, while sympathy for the Armenian side, on the contrary, has decreased by about half (8%). At the same time, three-quarters of respondents do not support any of the parties to the conflict at all. More than half of Russians support the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh, their number has not changed significantly since the last measurement in 2020. More than half of Russians have a positive attitude towards Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Conflict with Ukraine: Assessments for September 2023
17.11.2023

In September 2023, less than half of the respondents closely followed the events in Ukraine. The ideas about what is happening are quite stable. The level of support for the actions of the Russian armed forces remains high(72%). Just like last month, there are slightly more supporters of the start of negotiations than there are supporters of the continuation of hostilities. The military actions in Ukraine at the same time cause Russians to be proud of Russia, as well as anxiety and fear. There is a high level of concern about the shelling of Russian territories – 91%, the supply of weapons to Ukraine by Western countries – 79%, the counteroffensive of Ukrainian troops – 62%. More than half of the respondents fear that a general mobilization may be announced.
Conflict with Ukraine: Assesments for late August 2023
13.11.2023

In August, attention to Ukrainian events slightly decreased: less than half of the respondents closely monitor them. The level of support for the actions of the Russian armed forces remains high. Just like last month, there are slightly more supporters of the start of negotiations than there are supporters of the continuation of hostilities. However, most Russians are not ready to make concessions to Ukraine for the sake of ending the military operation and concluding a peace agreement.
Institutional Trust: September 2023
10.11.2023

Since the previous survey last year, trust in most public institutions has grown slightly. However, the changes in most positions are insignificant. The greatest increase in institutional trust was observed last year as a result of the general consolidation of public opinion against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The president, the army, the state security agencies, the government and the church enjoy the greatest confidence, as they did last year. Big business, trade unions and political parties are the least trusted, but trust in these institutions is reaching its maximum values today since the beginning of measurements.
Public perception of Western sanctions: June 2023
03.11.2023

Concern about Western sanctions remains at a low level. As before, people of low income and older ages who feel the vulnerability of their economic situation are more concerned about sanctions. Among the consequences of sanctions restrictions, respondents are most concerned about the freezing of Russian assets abroad, the cancellation of cultural events with the participation of Russian artists and the departure of a number of Western companies from the Russian Federation. The majority of respondents note that the sanctions have not created problems for them and their families, and also believe that Russia should continue its policy despite the sanctions.
Ideas about the problems of Russian society: August 2023
27.10.2023

Respondents still consider inflation to be the main problem. However, the severity of this problem has slightly weakened. Problems related to corruption and bribery, as well as a complex of problems related to foreign policy conflicts in which the country participates, ranked second and third by a large margin. There is a high concern about the increase in the retirement age and the general poverty of the majority of the population. Last year, against the background of the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, the significance of most problems weakened, then as people get used to the conflict, severity of the problems begins to increase again. Amidst fires and drone strikes, concern about the threat of explosions and terrorist acts continues to grow.
Attitude to Vladimir Putin
20.10.2023

Most respondents describe their attitude to V. Putin as a positive-neutral. Two-thirds of respondents would like to re-elect the current head of state in 2024. Supporters of his re-election explain this by the fact that V.Putin “has the right policy,” “a good leader,” “for the people,” “there is no alternative to him.” Opponents of re-election say that he “has been in office for a long time,” “I don’t like his policies,” “changes are needed.” According to the respondents V. Putin expresses the interests of the “siloviki”, as well as “ordinary people”, “oligarchs” and the “middle class”

What Mark Did Yevgeny Prigozhin’s “Mutiny” Leave on Public Opinion?
07.07.2023

Based on end-of-June survey and focus group discussions, Denis Volkov writes that the prevailing opinion among Russians is that Prigozhin’s “march on Moscow” has not weakened the authority of the central government and some believe it has even strengthened it.
No End in Sight: Why Russians Do Not Expect the Conflict in Ukraine to End Anytime Soon
13.06.2023

Based on regular surveys and focus group discussions, Denis Volkov for Russia.Post writes that events in May – including the successes of the Wagner group and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory – convince people that the war in Ukraine should be continued.
Are Meaningful Public Opinion Polls Possible in Today’s Russia?
24.04.2023

Ever since Vladimir Putin announced the start of a special military operation (SMO), public opinion polls in Russia have been criticized with renewed vigor. Usually, critics give the following reasons why Russian polls cannot be trusted. Some argue that in 2022, the response rate has declined sharply and people’s reluctance to participate in surveys has increased. Others say that respondents interrupt interviews as soon as the conversation turns to events in Ukraine. Some say that only supporters of the government are now participating in the polls, while opposition-minded citizens prefer to abstain. Others speak of survey list experiments, which seem to show lower support rates, and claim that these show the “real mood” of the people. Finally, the most extreme critics of polls say that polls are not relevant because they do not show what people “really think.” Let us take a look at each of these allegations in turn.

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