Conflict with Ukraine: Assessments for April 2024

Half of Russians continue to monitor the situation around Ukraine more or less closely. The level of support for the Russian Armed Forces remains high, they are supported by three quarters of Russians. After a short decline at the beginning of the year, the share of Russians who advocate peace talks began to recover — now it is almost 50 %. At the same time, if the resident had decided to stop military operations already “this week”, the majority (71%) would have supported his decision. However, this share is reduced to 30% if the return of new territories became a condition for the end of the conflict. Russians are not always able to adequately assess how widespread their own views on the “special operation” are in society.

Public opinion on capital punishment and the use of torture

More than half of the respondents generally support the use of capital punishment, and a third do not support it. The terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall did not lead to an increase in the number of supporters of the death penalty — today their number is slightly less than during the previous measurement in May 2021. Respondents who support the use of capital punishment motivate their position by saying that there should be fair retribution for serious crimes, as well as by the fact that severe punishment will help maintain order. Opponents of the death penalty primarily say that “it is inhumane” and fear possible miscarriages of justice. Slightly less than half of the respondents admit torture of detainees in exceptional cases and, above all, to those who have committed serious crimes, a third believes that torture is unacceptable under any circumstances.

Ideas about the problems of Russian society: March 2024

More than half of the respondents are primarily concerned about rising prices, a third indicated concerns related to the conduct of a “special military operation”, three out of ten fear the threat of terrorist attacks. Concerns about inflation or the availability of medicine and education remain at a constant level, while worries about most socio-economic problems have subsided in the past few years. The recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall has noticeably exacerbated anxiety about possible terrorist attacks, as well as hostility towards migrants. The perception of social problems is significantly influenced by the respondents’ belonging to a particular social group.

Emigration sentiments and attitudes towards people who left Russia: March 2024

Only 9% of Russians would like to move abroad, this is the minimum figure for the entire observation period. There are several more such people among the youngest Russians, but even here the number of those wishing to emigrate has more than tripled in three years. The reasons for emigration are primarily the desire to provide children with a decent future, the political and economic situation in Russia, as well as interest in another culture. Among the areas of possible emigration, respondents more often name the United States, European countries and Turkey. One in six of the respondents among their relatives and friends have people who have gone abroad for permanent residence in the last 2-3 years, this proportion is higher among oppositional citizens. A negative or neutral attitude prevails towards those who have left.

The audience of Internet users, social networks, messengers and VPN services

Four out of five Russians access the Internet daily (in 2001, only 2%). Most of these are young respondents, but the number of older users is growing. Two thirds of the respondents regularly use social networks, and this proportion has tripled since 2011. The most popular social networks are VK and YouTube, and their audience continues to grow (for example, VK’s audience has tripled in 13 years). 80% of the respondents use messengers, and this number has doubled in 8 years. Whatsapp and Telegram are the most popular, and their audience is growing. A quarter of Russians use VNP services at least from time to time, over the past two years their share has hardly changed.

The role of television and the Internet as the main sources of news and the TOP most popular Russian journalists

Television remains the main source of information by audience reach and trust among Russians. At the same time, the combined audience of various news sources on the Internet exceeded the audience of TV news. Younger, educated and affluent respondents are more likely to get their news from the Internet. Older people, as well as less affluent and less educated respondents, are more likely to watch news on television. The audience of telegram channels has stabilized at the level of a quarter of the country’s population after a sharp increase in 2022. The audience of video blogs is slowly increasing, but the majority of respondents do not watch them. The most popular journalists, leading socio-political programs were V. Solovyov, O. Skabeeva, E. Popov, M. Simonyan and D. Kisilev. Independent bloggers and journalists are losing their audience.

Mass assessments of the past presidential elections

The majority of respondents are satisfied with the results of the elections, expect changes for the better in this regard and believe that the elections were held fairly; these figures are higher compared to the results of polls after the previous elections. The opinion about the elections strongly depends on the attitude of respondents to the government: positive assessments prevail among those who support the president, and negative ones among oppositional citizens. 75% of the respondents took part in the voting, of which the majority voted for the incumbent president. Among Vladimir Putin’s supporters, two—thirds decided on the choice long before the voting day, among supporters of other candidates, more than half were determined during the campaign. Most of the respondents voted on Friday, the absolute majority at the polling station. The main motives for voting were a “sense of duty”, a desire to support their candidate and the habit of going to the polls, the main motives for non—participation were employment and disbelief that participation could change something. According to the sociological services, about a third of the respondents followed the ratings of candidates.

Conflict with Ukraine: Assesments for March 2024

In March, attention to events in Ukraine increased. The level of support for the actions of the Russian armed forces remains consistently high. The number of supporters of peace talks has been declining since the end of last year, while the number of supporters of continued hostilities remains virtually unchanged. Supporters of the peace talks explain their position by saying that “there are many victims,” “people are dying,” and “war fatigue has accumulated.” Those who advocate the continuation of hostilities explain their opinion by saying that “it is necessary to go to the end,” “finish what has been started,” “destroy fascism,” “negotiations will lead to nothing.” About half of the respondents do not rule out a second wave of partial mobilization, but their number has decreased over the past year. The majority of respondents support the annexation of Crimea and believe that it has brought Russia more benefits — their number has grown over the past few years.

Conflict with Ukraine: Assesments for February 2024

The level of support for the actions of the Russian armed forces remains consistently high. There are still slightly more than half of the respondents who support peace talks, but their number has decreased slightly over the past three months. Russians consider the main objectives of the “special operation” to be the protection of residents of Donbass and ensuring the security of the country. Over the past six months, the number of people who are confident that the “special operation” is going well has been growing; today 70% of respondents believe so. Against this background, the majority does not expect a new wave of mobilisation; the prevailing view is that there is no need for it. The level of concerns about mobilisation has almost halved compared to September last year — only a third of respondents is concerned.

The scale of public support for Boris Nadezhdin

At the end of February, almost half of the respondents knew about the refusal of the Central Election Commission to register Boris Nadezhdin to participate in the presidential elections. At the same time, about 9% allowed the opportunity to vote for Nadezhdin, but only 3% decided on the choice and were ready to cast their vote for him. About 7% of respondents approved of Nadezhdin’s activities in February, while the majority did not know anything about him. Support for the politician was higher among younger, better-off and more educated residents of the largest cities. Those who sympathized with Nadezhdin were those who saw in him a “fresh man”, a “new face” or a principled oppositionist. Respondents who did not sympathize with the policy gave the most general arguments, or called him “unreliable”, “frivolous” and oriented towards the West.

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